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Abstract 
Groups, companies, and organizations identify themselves via symbols. Symbols have the potential to 
create group identity and at the same time create group boundaries, thus allowing for achieving the 
benefits of cooperation by ingroup members. We use a laboratory experiment to study the role of group 
identity, created by the use of symbols, in mitigating the hold-up problem.  As a team symbol we employ 
color t-shirts. We find that the usage of t-shirts itself does not create a strong enough group identity to 
mitigate the hold-up problem. However, in our previous research, we found that group identity created 
by t-shirts and a group chat aimed to help team members to solve a task is capable of resolving the hold-
up problem. These findings are consistent with the everyday practice where organizations often make 
significant investments in team-building and socialization activities, suggesting that an important 
objective of such activities might be to strengthen group identity so that it is effective even in highly 
strategic environments. 
 
JEL Classification: C91, D20, L20 
Keywords: altruism, experiment, group identity, hold-up problem, other-regarding preferences, relation-
specific investment, symbols, team membership1 
 
1. Introduction 
Symbols, visible (observable) manifestations of groups and organizations, play a prominent role in the 
study of organizational behavior, organizational psychology, and social psychology.
1 From the 
perspective of social psychology symbols reinforce organizational or group identity and enhance 
cooperation among ingroup members by differentiating them from outgroup members.
2 Symbols, such 
as dress or uniforms,
3 provide a clear way of identifying group boundaries and thus allow for achieving 
the benefits of cooperation without the risk of excessive costs by limiting altruistic behavior towards 
ingroup members. Social psychologists describe ingroup as a bounded community of mutual and 
depersonalized expectations of cooperation. Such expectations motivate adherence to ingroup norms 
and promote behavior that ensures that one is recognized as an ingroup member (Brewer, 1981 and 
1999). However, the use of symbols in organizations is often confounded with communication, social 
interaction and possibly other contributing factors, making it hard to clearly identify their contribution 
to creating identity and subsequent effect on strategic decision-making, thus opening the door for 
experimental identification of this effect under controlled laboratory conditions. 
Symbols reinforce organizational or group identity, and sharpen boundaries between organizations and 
groups. This paper studies whether group identity, created by the use of symbols, is capable of 
mitigating the hold-up problem, which is a key ingredient of research on organizational/firm boundaries 
(see Williamson, 1985; Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990). Under the standard setup, 
relation-specific investment in bilateral trade creates a surplus to be shared between two parties 
because the value of such investment is appreciably lower in any use other than supporting the 
transaction between the two parties. In a world of incomplete contracts and self-regarding preferences, 
the surplus-sharing leads to inefficiency due to investment at less than the socially optimal levels (Grout, 
1984; Williamson, 1985). Our experiment employs the following hold-up game. A seller determines 
whether or not to invest $10. If the seller invests, $14 is made available to be shared between the seller 
and the buyer, who makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer $p to the seller. If the seller takes the offer, the 
                                                           
1 Within organizations symbols might serve multiple purposes: influence behavior by eliciting internalized values 
and norms, facilitate member communication about organizational life, and integrate emotion, cognition and 
behavior into shared codes that define and support the organization as well as represent its purpose (Rafaeli & 
Worline, 1999; see also Jones, 1993, and Katz & Kahn, 1978).  
2 A frequently cited example in the group identity literature is that Phil Knight, the founder of Nike, and many of his 
employees have the Nike “swoosh” logo tattooed on their calves (Camerer and Mermandier, 2007) as 
manifestation of their identification with the organization and loyalty to the brand. There are multiple other 
examples where employees or users identify themselves as “Apple-person, Mercedes-guy” and take pride in being 
a member of the group and willingly follow group norms or rules. . 
3 There exists a vast literature studying roles of uniforms and organizational dress in symbolizing values and beliefs 
of an organization, conveying identity, and asserting organizational control and compliance (see for example 
Joseph & Alex, 1972; Joseph, 1986; de Marley, 1986; Davis, 1992; Roach-Higgins & Eicher, 1992; Rafaeli & Pratt 
1993; Rafaeli, Dutton, Harquail & Mackie-Lewis, 1997 and for a nice survey of this literature Pratt & Rafaeli, 1997). 2 
 
seller and the buyer respectively receive $p and $(14 - p). If the seller rejects the offer, both of them 
receive $0. Upon the seller’s investment, a self-regarding buyer would offer zero (or very small amount 
of money), which the seller would reluctantly accept. Anticipating this, the seller does not invest in the 
first place. This is a “problem” in the sense that the joint-profit maximizing investment does not occur. 
Many authors have previously proposed various remedies to the problem (see, for example, Klein, 
Crawford, and Alchian, 1978; Williamson, 1979, 1983; Aghion and Bolton, 1992; Aghion and Tirole, 
1997). 
The previous literature studies the link between the organizational/firm boundaries and the hold-up 
problem (Klein, Crawford & Alchian, 1978; Williamson, 1979, among others) however, the behavioral 
impact of group identity in this strategic interaction has not been explored until recently. Our recent 
research attempted to fill this gap in the literature. In Morita & Servátka (2011, henceforth MS) we 
conjecture that group identity might mitigate the hold-up problem by increasing the degree of altruism 
towards another group member (see Chen & Li, 2009 for a seminal paper on the effect of group identity 
on other-regarding preferences) and experimentally test this conjecture using the hold-up game 
described above.
4 In MS the subjects were randomly divided into two teams, identified by team 
symbols, namely different color t-shirts.
5 Prior to making decisions in the hold-up game the members of 
the same team could communicate with one another via an online chat to help one another obtain 
correct answers. The group identity was thus induced by team symbols as well as team members’ 
helping behavior, creating identity in a similar way as observed in everyday life where identity is often 
on purpose strengthen by socialization by company retreats, team building activities focusing on trust, 
communication, or problem-solving as well as getting together at social functions such as Christmas 
party or morning tea.
6 MS observe that when the subjects were paired with another team-member, 
their altruism increased compared to a situation when they are paired with a member of the other 
team. As a result, they were more likely to invest and share the surplus following an investment. While 
such design provides evidence that group identity can alter economic incentives, it does not allow for a 
conclusion whether symbols themselves (through delineating group boundaries) are sufficient to induce 
group identity and influence decisions.  
                                                           
4 In a related paper, however without focus on group identity, Sloof, Oosterbeek, and Sonnemans (2007) also show 
that social preferences can increase investment in the hold-up problem. 
5 It is also the only economic experiment that we are aware of focusing on the role of symbols affecting decision-
making in a strategic environment.  
6 See, for example, About.com Guide on “How to Build Powerfully Successful Work Teams” by Susan M. Heathfield 
(http://humanresources.about.com/od/involvementteams/a/team_one_stop.htm) or a popular British TV reality 
series The Naked Office. 
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In the current paper we present an experiment that identifies the role of symbols in creating group 
identity and separates their effect from helping behavior in the context of the hold-up game.  We find 
that group identity induced by t-shirts is not strong enough to sufficiently strengthen agents’ other-
regarding preferences to mitigate the hold-up problem. This finding and MS’s finding together tell us 
that strengthening group identity through helping behavior has a significant effect on agents’ behavior 
in mitigating the hold-up problem.   
The observation that group identity can be formed through a common goal and through helping other 
group members is supported by the experimental evidence of Eckel and Grossman (2005), Chen & Li 
(2009) and Chen & Chen (forthcoming), each of which include some form of social interaction prior to 
the decision-making part of the experiment as means of strengthening group identity. In terms of the 
experimental design, the closest studies to MS are Chen & Li (2009) and Chen & Chen (forthcoming), 
both of which use an online chat to solve a collective problem. In Chen & Li (2009) the subjects face a 
task to answer questions on which artist, Klee or Kandinski, made each of two paintings shown to them. 
Similar to MS, Chen & Li’s subjects voluntarily exchanged information with members of their own group 
via a chat program to help one another obtain correct answers. When comparing subjects’ allocation 
decisions across 24 different games, Chen & Li observe that including chat had a significant effect on 
behavior in only one of them, however, it did increase self-reported group attachment. Chen & Chen 
(forthcoming) use the same task as Chen & Li and find that the subjects choose a higher level of effort in 
a minimum effort game than when chat is not possible, providing mixed evidence on the effect of chat 
on subjects’ subsequent behavior.
7, 
8 
Our finding that helping behavior has a significant effect on agents’ behavior stands in contrast with 
Chen & Li’s finding mentioned above. Chen & Li studied a number of simple allocation and sequential 
games, which have at most two decisions to be made by players. The hold-up game that we study, in 
contrast, involves three decisions; the seller’s investment decision, the buyer’s take-it-or-leave-it offer, 
and the seller’s decision whether or not to accept the offer. In this sense, the hold-up game involves a 
higher degree of strategic interactions, and we feel that this might be a driving force of the difference 
between our finding and Chen & Li’s finding. That is, group identity created solely by the use of symbol 
might not be strong enough to make a significant impact on agents’ behavior in a highly strategic 
environment, and thus strengthening group identity through helping behavior could play a more 
prominent role.  
                                                           
7 Chen & Li (2009) differ from Chen & Chen (forthcoming) also in the way how the no-chat control was 
implemented. In Chen & Li (2009) the task of guessing the author of the paintings was excluded completely, 
whereas in Chen & Chen (forthcoming) it was still part of the design, but subjects had to provide their answers 
individually without being able to use chat. The comparison of the current experiment with MS (presented in 
subsection 4.2) is in its nature similar to Chen & Li. 
8 There are numerous other studies exploring theoretically and empirically the impact of group identity on 
economic decision-making. We review them in some detail in Morita and Servátka (2011). 4 
 
 2. Insights from social psychology and experimental economics research on social identity 
The social psychology literature on social identity is vast (see McDermott, 2009 for a recent survey). 
Most of the experimental research that focuses on testing various aspects of social identity theory (Billig 
& Tajfel, 1973; Tajfel & Turner, 1979) employs the so-called minimal group paradigm of inducing a group 
identity in a laboratory setting. A minimal group consists of people who share only one social category 
and who have no social interaction.
9 The criterion for categorizing subjects into groups is often trivial, 
such as preference for Klee’s or Kandinski’s paintings or tendency to overestimate or underestimate the 
number of dots on a screen. The minimal group paradigm was introduced by Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & 
Flament (1971) who observed that categorization alone was sufficient to generate ingroup favoritism. 
Two competing explanations, social categorization (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) and expectations of 
generalized reciprocity among ingroup members (Yamagishi, Jin & Kiyonari, 1999; Yamagishi & Kiyonari, 
2000) have emerged as potential mechanisms causing ingroup favoritism.  
According to Yamagishi & Kiyonari (2000), Tajfel and his colleagues overlooked that the allocator’s 
payoffs were determined by other subjects, and thus did not give an unconditional preferential 
treatment to ingroup members. This is supported by the finding of Karp, Jin, Yamagishi & Shinotsuka 
(1993) who removed the interdependence of payoffs from the design by paying the decision-maker a 
fixed amount. Such change in design lead to no preferential treatment of ingroup members. Yamagishi 
& Kiyonari (2000) thus conjecture that the ingroup favoritism is based on expectations that preferential 
treatment will be reciprocated by the other ingroup members, tying it to depersonalized trust argument 
advanced by Brewer (1981). Yamagishi & Kiyonari find that in a prisoner’s dilemma with a large number 
of strategies the subjects cooperate more with an ingroup member in the simultaneous version of the 
game but that this effect disappears when the game is played sequentially (with all subjects acting as 
first movers and no second movers although the subjects were lead to believe that there were second 
movers). They conclude that the effect is driven by the expectations of generalized reciprocity but that 
these expectations are eliminated by the presence of direct reciprocity in the sequential treatment. 
While Yamagishi & Kiyonari’s conclusions might suggest the observed helping behavior in answering 
trivia questions could have triggered or strengthened expectations of generalized reciprocity in MS 
design, the groups in MS are not minimal, the game used is different from that of Yamagishi & Kiyonari 
and the ingroup favoritism is observed under sequential play. Therefore, it is not clear to what degree 
the helping behavior prior to playing the hold-up game influenced subjects’ decisions to assess the 
relative importance of symbols in creating group identity and alleviating hold-up. The results by 
Yamagishi and his colleagues can also be interpreted along the lines that strategic element of interaction 
is capable of eliminating ingroup favoritism. Given that the hold-up game is a game where the parties 
interact in three stages as opposed to two, it can be seen as a highly strategic environment. If 
                                                           
9 There are four criteria for a group to be minimal: 1. Random assignment based on a trivial criterion; 2. No social 
interaction; 3. Anonymous membership; and 4. No interdependence of interests (i.e., the decision task requires no 
link between the decision-maker’s payoffs and his choices). Most economic experiments violate the fourth 
criterion. 5 
 
Yamagishi’s finding generalizes/extends to other environments beyond prisoner’s dilemma, we should 
not observe group identity created by symbols being able to resolve the hold-up problem. 
 
3. Experimental design and procedures 
Does group identity, created by the use of symbols, mitigate the hold-up problem? To provide insights 
into the inner workings of symbols we present an experiment in which group identity is created solely by 
wearing team uniforms and compare subjects’ behavior under such circumstances with data previously 
reported in Morita and Servátka (2011) that involves the use of team uniforms as well as an additional 
task in which the subjects on the same team could offer and receive help from one another.  The 
inclusion of this additional task does not introduce a repeated game because subject anonymity makes it 
impossible for any subject to acquire individual reputation. Both experiments included two treatments 
based on pairing of subjects (Same-Team and Different-Team) implemented in an across-subjects 
design. Below we summarize the experimental protocols. Instructions are provided in the appendix. 
3.1. The effect of symbols on creating social identity 
At the beginning of the experiment the participants were randomly divided into Orange Team and 
Yellow Team by drawing colored pieces of paper from a large opaque envelope. Orange Team was 
seated in the front of the room and Yellow Team in the back. The experimenters then handed subjects 
their respective color t-shirts, representing team uniforms, and asked everyone to put them on. The 
subjects were told they could keep their t-shirts after the experiment was over. Once everyone was 
wearing a t-shirt, we sequentially asked the teams to get up, look at their teammates and verify that 
everyone on the team was wearing the same color.  
Then neutrally framed instructions were handed out. In the Same-Team treatment, the subjects were 
instructed that each person from the Yellow Team would be randomly paired with another person from 
the Yellow Team and each person from the Orange Team with another person from the Orange Team. In 
the Different-Team treatment, the subjects were instructed that each person from the Yellow Team 
would be randomly paired with a person from the Orange Team. The instructions emphasized that the 
interaction was anonymous and that the experimenters would keep track of all decisions using ID 
numbers. 
A coin was publicly flipped to randomly determine the roles depending on the row in which a subject 
was sitting. The allocation of the First Mover (henceforth FM) and Second Mover (SM) to a particular 
pair was done by experimenter based on a pre-assigned matching, unknown to the subjects. The 
decisions were divided into three stages. In Stage 1, the FM had to decide whether or not to invest 
his/her 10 NZD show up fee in order to create 14 NZD for the pair. If the FM decided not to invest the 10 
NZD show up fee, then no money was created and both movers kept their show up fees. If the FM 
decided to invest, then 14 NZD was made available to split between the two paired persons.  An offer of 
how to split the 14 NZD was determined by the SM in Stage 2. In Stage 3, the FM learned about the 6 
 
offer, and could either accept it or reject it.  If the FM accepted the offer, both movers received the 
respective amounts stated in the offer.  If the FM rejected, the 14 NZD disappeared and both the FM 
and the SM received 0 NZD. (The SM still kept the show up fee of 10 NZD.) The game tree (which was 
not shown to the subjects) is presented in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. The Hold-up Game 
 
 
In an attempt to minimize confusion of subjects we included three control questions which all 
participants had to answer correctly before proceeding to the decision-making part. The SM’s offers for 
the control questions were generated randomly for each session. After the subjects answered the 
questions, the experimenters verified their correctness by inspecting each subject’s answers individually 
and if necessary, provided additional assistance and explanation until the subject calculated all answers 
correctly. Then the three scenarios were summarized publicly by the experimenter. 
Before the decision-making part started, the subjects were reminded about their pairing. In order to 
transfer information between matched pairs, one of the experimenters collected and later redistributed 
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procedure was implemented with the aim to prevent the exchange of superfluous information during 
the game and aid in maintaining the anonymity of individual decisions. 
At the end of the session we asked subjects to complete a short post-experiment questionnaire and 
offered 5 NZD for doing so to ensure that no subject left the experiment with zero payoffs. Finally, all 
subjects were privately paid their earnings for the session. 
3.2. The effect of symbols strengthened by helping: Experiment by Morita and Servátka (2011) 
The experiment reported in Morita and Servátka (2011) consisted of two tasks: (1) Answering two trivia 
questions and (2) playing the hold-up game which was implemented exactly as in Experiment 1. Task 1 
was implemented as follows. 
The subjects were handed out Task 1 instructions on a sheet that also included two trivia questions. The 
subjects had an opportunity to anonymously communicate via computer chat for five minutes with their 
own team members (i.e., in both Same-Team and Different-Team treatments, a person on the Orange 
Team could chat with all remaining subjects on the Orange Team and a person on the Yellow Team 
could chat with all remaining subjects on the Yellow Team) prior to individually answering the 
questions.
10  Such communication allowed the subjects to provide and receive help from their 
teammates.
 The subjects were instructed they would be paid 2 NZD for each correct answer, but would 
not find out the results until the end of the experiment. This was to control for the level of created social 
identity that could otherwise vary depending on whether a good or bad advice by team members was 
provided. Once all subjects answered the trivia questions, the experimenters collected their answer 
sheets. The experiment then proceeded with the hold-up game. 
 
4. Results 
Both experiments took place in the New Zealand Experimental Economics Laboratory (NZEEL) at the 
University of Canterbury with 232 subjects in the current experiment and 258 subjects in MS. The 
recruited subjects have never previously participated in an economic experiment at this university. On 
average, an experimental session in the current study lasted around 50 minutes including initial 
instruction period and payment of subjects while in MS about 75 minutes. The subjects earned on 
average 10.44 New Zealand Dollars (NZD) from the game in the current experiment and 10.33 NZD in 
MS, 5 NZD for filling out the questionnaire and in MS also up to 4 NZD from answering trivia questions.  
 
                                                           
10 The chat was programmed and conducted with z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). 8 
 
Table 1. Summary Statistics 
  The Current Experiment  Morita and Servátka (2011) 
  Same-Team  Different-Team  Same-Team  Different-Team 
# subject pairs  54  62  48  81 
Investment rate  20/54 = 37%  16/62 = 25.8%  21/48 = 43.8%  21/81 = 25.9% 
Avg. offer  8.55  7.75  10.38  8.74 
Median offer  8.50  8  12  10 
Rejection rate  1/20 = 5%  2/16 = 12.5%  2/21 = 9.5%  4/21 = 19% 




4.1 Do symbols create social identity capable of resolving the hold-up problem?   
The first two columns of Table 1 present summary statistics from the current experiment. Fifty-four 
subject pairs participated in the Same-Team treatment. In Stage 1, twenty FMs invested, yielding an 
investment rate of 37%. Following an investment SMs offered on average 8.55 NZD in Stage 2. Only one 
of these offers (6 NZD) was rejected in Stage 3 by the respective FM, resulting in a rejection rate of 5%.  
Sixty-two subject pairs participated in the Different-Team treatment. In Stage 1, sixteen FMs invested, 
yielding an investment rate of 25.8%. Following an investment SMs offered on average 7.75 NZD in 
Stage 2. Two of these offers (both 4 NZD) were rejected in Stage 3 by the respective FM, resulting in a 
rejection rate of 12.5%. The distributions of all offers are presented in Figure 2a. 
First, we test whether the group identity created by t-shirts was strong enough to induce FMs to invest 
more often when paired with their team members as opposed to members of the other team. We 
compare the FMs’ investment rates in our two treatments: While the investment rate in the Same-Team 
treatment is higher than in the Different-Team treatment, the one-sided Fisher’s exact test reveals that 
the difference is marginally insignificant (p=0.135).  
Second, we compare whether upon the FM’s investment, the SM’s offer is higher in the presence of 
group identity induced by the use of symbols. As suggested by MS the reason behind such difference 
would be due to a higher level of SM’s altruism induced by group identity. The one-sided Wilcoxon rank-
sum test detects that the offers in the Same-Team treatment were no different than in the Different-
Team treatment (p=0.282). In both treatments those FMs who invested lost money. This result suggests 
that group identity induced by t-shirts was not strong enough to sufficiently strengthen agents’ other-9 
 
regarding preferences to mitigate hold-up. Finally, due to a small number of observations, we are unable 
to meaningfully compare the rejections rates in Stage 3. 
 
 
Figure 2a.          Figure 2b.    
    Distributions of Offers in the Current Experiment    Distributions of Offers in Morita & Servátka (2011) 
 
4.2. A between-experiment comparison: The effect of helping on creating social identity  
Forty-eight subject pairs participated in the Same-Team treatment in Morita and Servátka (2011). In 
Stage 1, twenty-one FMs invested, yielding an investment rate of 43.8%. Following an investment SMs 
offered on average 10.38 NZD in Stage 2. Only two of these offers (5 and 8 NZD) were rejected in Stage 3 
by the respective FMs, resulting in a rejection rate of 9.5% and rejecting an average offer of 6.50 NZD. 
Eighty-one subject pairs participated in the Different-Team treatment presented in MS. In Stage 1, 
twenty-one invested, yielding an investment rate of 25.9%. Following an investment, SMs offered on 
average 8.74 NZD. Four offers were rejected (2, 3.50, 6, and 7) resulting in a rejection rate of 19% and 
rejecting an average offer of 4.63 NZD. The distributions of all offers in MS are presented in Figure 2b. 
As reported in MS, team membership created by the use of t-shirts as well as chat significantly increases 
the investment rate (p=0.036) as well as the share of the surplus offered back to the FM (p=0.012) and 
thus mitigates the hold-up problem. Here we report the difference between the two experiments that 
are due to including chat. In Same-Team treatment the investment rate has increased (37% vs. 43.8% in 
the current experiments and MS, respectively), however the Fisher 1-sided test does not detect such 
increase to be significant, p=0.344). In Different-Team treatment the investment rate has not changed at 
all (25.8% vs. 25.9% in the current experiments and MS, respectively). This result suggests that it is both 
t-shirts and chat together that are jointly responsible for the increase in investment rate observed in MS. 
Finally, the no change in investment rate in Different-Team treatments is in line with Brewer (1999) who 
notes that ingroup favoritism does not have to be accompanied by outgroup discrimination. 10 
 
On the other hand, including chat has significantly increased the average offers in Same-Team (8.55 vs. 
10.38 in the current experiments and MS, respectively; p = 0.014), but not in Different-Team (7.75 vs. 
8.74; p=0.234). This result highlights the fact the chat increases other-regarding preferences of SMs. This 
makes our finding regarding the effect of online chat on subjects’ behavior in the ensuing game stand in 
contrast with Chen & Li (2009) who find no significant difference in subjects’ choices in 23 out of 24 
games they investigate. Then again, Chen & Li do find that chat significantly increases self-reported 
group attachment. While our design does not include such measure, we conjecture that it is the 
attachment to the group that mediates the increase in other-regarding preferences, however, due to 
obvious differences in the structures of games, its’ impact is detected in our study but is not observed by 
Chen & Li. A strong effect of communication with team members while solving a simple task is also 




Groups, companies, and organizations identify themselves via symbols. Symbols have the potential to 
create group identity and at the same time create group boundaries, thus allowing for achieving the 
benefits of cooperation by ingroup members. However, in the field it is almost impossible to avoid 
communication and socialization among group members, making it hard to identify the (pure) 
contribution of symbols in creating group identity and its subsequent effect on behavior. An experiment, 
although stylized, allows separating these effects from one another. 
In the current paper we study the role of group identity, created by the use of symbols, in mitigating the 
hold-up problem.  As a team symbol we employ color t-shirts. We find that the usage of t-shirts itself 
does not create a strong enough group identity to mitigate the hold-up problem. However, in our 
previous research (Morita & Servátka, 2011), we found that group identity created by t-shirts and a 
group exercise of helping team members answer trivia questions  is capable of mitigating the hold-up 
problem. These findings are consistent with the everyday practice observed in the field where 
organizations often make significant investments in team-building and socialization activities such as 
company retreats and Christmas parties. Our finding thus suggests that an important objective of such 
activities might be to strengthen group identity so that it is effective even in highly strategic 
environments. 
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11 Chen & Chen (forthcoming) also provide a nice model incorporating group-contingent other-regarding 
preferences into Monderer & Shapley’s (1996) theory of potential games predicting how salient group identities 
are capable of affecting equilibrium selection. 11 
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Appendix: Subject Instructions and Decision Forms 
INSTRUCTIONS 
No Talking Allowed  
Thank you for coming.  The purpose of this session is to study how people make decisions in a particular 
situation.  From now until the end of the session, unauthorized communication of any nature with other 
participants is prohibited.  If you violate this rule we will have to exclude you from the experiment and 
from all payments.  If you have a question after we finish reading the instructions, please raise your hand 
and the experimenter will approach you and answer your question in private.  
Two Tasks 
You will be asked to participate in two tasks during the experiment. The instructions for Task 2 will be 




You have been divided randomly into two teams, called the Yellow Team and the Orange Team.  People 
from both teams are wearing their respective team uniforms:  The Yellow Team is wearing yellow t-shirts 
and the Orange Team is wearing orange t-shirts. 
 
Earnings 
In Task 2, every participant will get $10 as a show up fee. Your final experimental earnings will depend on 
your decisions and on the decisions of others. 
 
Anonymity 
Each person from the Yellow Team will be randomly paired with another person from the Yellow Team.  
Each person from the Orange Team will be randomly paired with another person from the Orange Team.  
No one will learn the identity of the person (s)he is paired with.  Your role and your ID number will be 
written on the top of your decision sheet.  The experimenters will keep track of your decisions and your 
paired person’s decisions by your ID numbers.  Because your decision is private, we ask that you do not tell 
anyone your decision or your earnings either during or after the experiment. 
 
Pairing and Roles 
Within each pair, one person is going to be randomly assigned to be the First Mover and the other person to 
be the Second Mover.  The decisions are divided into three stages: 
 
Stage 1: The First Mover’s Investment Decision 
The First Mover decides whether or not to invest his/her $10 show up fee in order to create $14 for the 
pair: 
  If the First Mover invests his/her $10 show up fee, then $14 will be made available to split between 
the two paired persons.  The split of $14 will be determined by the Second Mover. 
 
  If the First Mover does not invest, then no money is created and stages 2 and 3 are cancelled. 
 
Stage 2: The Second Mover’s Offer 
If the First Mover invested in Stage 1, the Second Mover decides how much money out of $14 to offer to 15 
 
the First Mover and how much of it to keep. 
 
Stage 3: The First Mover’s Acceptance/Rejection 
The First Mover learns about the offer, and either accepts it or rejects it.  If the First Mover accepts, both 
movers receive the respective amounts stated in the offer.  If the First Mover rejects, the $14 disappears 
and both the First Mover and the Second Mover get $0. (The Second Mover still keeps his/her show up fee 
of $10.) 
 
Payment of Experimental Earnings 
Once all participants have made their decisions, the experimenters will collect the decision forms and 
calculate the payoffs.  Then you will be asked one by one to approach the experimenter in the hallway 
for the payment of your experimental earnings.  Once paid, please leave using the stairs and do not 
gather in front of the elevator. 
 







Please answer the following questions: 
 
1. If the First Mover invests and the Second Mover offers …. which is accepted by the First Mover, what 
are the First Mover’s final earnings? ………… 
What are the Second Mover’s final earnings? ………….. 
 
2.  If the First Mover invests and the Second Mover offers …. which is rejected by the First Mover, what 
are the First Mover’s final earnings? ………… 
What are the Second Mover’s final earnings? ………….. 
 
3. If the First Mover does not invest what are the First Mover’s final earnings? ………… 
What are the Second Mover’s final earnings? ………….. 
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Decision Form                    First Mover # 
Stage 1: THE FIRST MOVER’S INVESTMENT DECISION 
The First Mover makes his/her decision by circling (1) or (2): 
(1) I choose not to invest my $10 show up fee 
OR 
(2) I choose to invest my $10 show up fee 
 
 
Stage 2: THE SECOND MOVER’S OFFER 
The paired First Mover chose to invest the $10 show up fee. Therefore, $14 is made available for the 
Second Mover to split between the two paired persons. The Second Mover makes his/her decision how 
much money out of $14 to offer to the First Mover by completing both statements below: 
I offer $_____________ to the paired First Mover. 
Therefore, I will keep $_____________ for myself. 
 




Stage 3: THE FIRST MOVER’S ACCEPTANCE/REJECTION 
The First Mover makes his/her decision by circling (A) or (R): 
(A) I accept the Second Mover’s offer.  
OR 
(R) I reject the Second Mover’s offer. 
 
If  no  investment  was  made  in  Stage  1  the  First  Mover  writes  “No  investment”  in  the  space  below: 
_____________ 17 
 
Decision Form                               Second Mover # 
Stage 1: THE FIRST MOVER’S INVESTMENT DECISION 
The First Mover makes his/her decision by circling (1) or (2): 
(1) I choose not to invest my $10 show up fee 
OR 
(2) I choose to invest my $10 show up fee 
 
 
Stage 2: THE SECOND MOVER’S OFFER 
The paired First Mover chose to invest the $10 show up fee. Therefore, $14 is made available for the 
Second Mover to split between the two paired persons. The Second Mover makes his/her decision how 
much money out of $14 to offer to the First Mover by completing both statements below: 
I offer $_____________ to the paired First Mover. 
Therefore, I will keep $_____________ for myself. 
 




Stage 3: THE FIRST MOVER’S ACCEPTANCE/REJECTION 
The First Mover makes his/her decision by circling (A) or (R): 
(A) I accept the Second Mover’s offer.  
OR 
(R) I reject the Second Mover’s offer. 
 
If  no  investment  was  made  in  Stage  1  the  First  Mover  writes  “No  investment”  in  the  space  below: 
_____________ 
 